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JOSHUA L. ROSENBLOOM
Using data from a sample of over 2,000 individual strikes in the United States from
1881 to 1894 this article examines geographic, industrial, and temporal variations in
the use of strikebreakers and the sources from which they were recruited. The use of
strikebreakers was not correlated with the business cycle and did not vary
appreciably by region or city size, but employers located outside the Northeast or in
smaller cities were more likely to use replacement workers recruited from other
places. The use of strikebreakers also varied considerably across industries, and was
affected by union authorization and strike size.
The forces determining wages and working conditions in American labormarkets were radically altered in the decades after the Civil War. Im-
provements in transportation and communication increased the ability of
workers to migrate in response to differential opportunities and encouraged
employers in labor-scarce areas to recruit workers from relatively more
labor-abundant regions. As local labor markets became increasingly in-
tegrated into broader regional and national labor markets during the late
nineteenth century, competitive pressures on wages and working conditions
grew, and the scope for local variations in the terms of employment de-
clined.1 In many industries these pressures were further compounded by
technological changes that encouraged the increasingly fine division of labor
and enabled employers to replace skilled craftworkers with semiskilled
operatives or unskilled laborers.2
The impact of these developments on American workers was profound.
Broader labor markets and technological changes expanded employment
opportunities for some workers, but for others they undermined efforts to
increase wages and improve working conditions.3 The increasing elasticity
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of labor supply made it difficult for local unions to advance wages. Having
won higher wages and more control over piece rates in 1881, for example,
carpenters in St. Louis found that "our advances in wages would soon be
lost through the influx of men from cities where wages were lower. Day
after day men came from other states where wages were $1.75 to S2."4 A
skilled butcher in Chicago put the matter more bluntly, observing simply
that the threat of being replaced by less-skilled workers was "the club held
above our heads at all times."5 The effects of increasing competition went
beyond the purely economic however, as a letter to a local newspaper from
a coal miner in Ohio's Hocking Valley made clear. When new arrivals
displaced long-time employees in the 1870s he wrote, the displaced workers
experienced "about the same emotions that an ordinary person would if
robbed of his home."6
One of the most visible and contentious manifestations of the increasing
competitive pressures in American labor markets in the late nineteenth
century was the widespread use of strikebreakers.7 The aggregate statistics
reproduced in Table 1 show that between 1881 and 1900 employers hired
over half a million replacement workers. This amounts to close to 10.8
percent of the 4.7 million workers who went on strike in this period. Of
these replacements, over 40 percent were brought to the location of the
strike from somewhere else, suggesting the important role that employers
played in expanding local labor supply. Employers' ability to replace
striking workers has long been regarded by labor historians as one of the
most potent weapons available to them in their efforts to defeat labor's
demands for improvements in employment conditions. Philip Foner argued,
for example, that "the failure of a great number of strikes in the cotton
textile, mining, iron and steel, cigar, railroad, and other industries must be
attributed in no small measure to the ability of employers to make use of
unskilled labor obtained from the labor exchanges and steamship companies
as strikebreakers."8
African-American strikebreaking between the Civil War and the 1930s, he found that strikebreaking
helped to encourage migration out of the South, and opened doors to industries and occupations from
which African-Americans had previously been barred by racial discrimination.
4Ulman, Rise, chap. 3. Quotation from Tygiel, "Tramping Artisans," p. 366.
5Quoted in Tuttle, "Labor Conflict," p. 412.
6Quoted in Gutman, "Reconstruction," p. 247.
'Although the widespread use of strikebreakers in this period has sometimes been attributed to the
large volume of immigration in the late nineteenth century, Ehrlich ("Immigrant Strikebreaking")
argued that recent immigrants were no more likely to serve as strikebreakers than were the native-born
or members of older immigrant groups. Based on articles and letters published in the National Labor
Tribune, a major labor weekly in the late nineteenth century, he attributed the frequency of
strikebreaking in the late nineteenth century to the generally abundant labor supply in this period, rather
than the volume of immigration per se.
8Foner, History, p. 17.
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TABLE :
AGGREGATE STRIKE STATISTICS, 1881-1900
Year
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
Total
Number
of
Strikes
471
454
478
443
645
1,432
1,436
906
1,075
1,833
1,717
1,298
1,305
1,349
1,215
1,026
1,078
1,056
1,797
1,779
.22,793
Number
on
Strike
101,070
120,857
122,198
117,313
158,584
407,152
272,776
103,218
205,068
285,900
245,042
163,499
195,008
505,049
285,742
183,813
332,570
182,067
308,267
399,656
4,694,849
New Employees
Number
10,957
11,353
11,434
11,833
19,077
39,854
39,549
16,700
16,725
31,034
34,115
25,847
21,907
75,092
24,726
13,289
16,108
19,064
36,303
31,590
506,557
Percentage
of
Strikers
10.8
9.4
9.3
10.1
12.0
9.8
14.5
16.2
8.2
10.9
13.9
15.8
11.2
14.9
8.7
7.2
4.8
10.5
11.8
7.9
10.8
New Employees
Brought from
Other Places
Number
3,949
5,356
4,450
4,324
7,224
12,932
18,173
5,237
6,802
12,393
17,378
13,492
11,017
35,198
9,221
5,128
7,344
7,335
16,171
11,331
214,445
Percentage
of New
Employees
36.0
47.2
38.9
36.5
37.9
32.4
46.0
31.4
40.7
39.9
50.9
52.2
50.3
46.9
37.3
38.6
45.6
38.5
44.5
35.9
42.3
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor, Sixteenth Annual Report, pp. 340-43.
Despite the importance that has conventionally been attributed to strike-
breaking there has been little systematic analysis of this aspect of late- nine-
teenth-century labor conflict. Rather, most discussions have concentrated on
a small number of highly visibly or contentious incidents, such as the great
railway strike of 1877 and the Homestead strike of 1892. Recently, however,
several studies have taken a more quantitative approach to the issue of
strikebreaking. As part of her research on the determinants of union mem-
bership, Debbie Mullin examined factors influencing the propensity to use
replacement workers in a sample of 395 strikes in Illinois between 1881 and
1886.9 She found that the propensity to use replacement workers increased
with city size and the duration of the strike, but decreased with the number
of strikers. She also noted some differences across industries and occupa-
tions, finding that unskilled workers were more likely to be replaced, where-
as strikers in the building trades, printing, and cooperage faced a lower risk
of replacement. Looking at the impact of state labor laws on strike activity,
Janet Currie and Joseph Ferrie found that the legal environment had strong
'Mullin, "Porous Umbrella."
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but "sometimes surprising" effects on the use of strikebreakers.10 Analyzing
data on over 12,000 strikes in 13 states in the Northeast and North Central
regions they found that laws legalizing unions and banning blacklists—both
apparently prolabor in their intentions—had the perverse effect of increasing
the probability that strikebreakers would be used, but that the use of strike-
breakers was less likely in states that had passed laws establishing maximum
hours for any group of male workers.
This article uses data from a random sample of over 2,000 individual
strikes between 1881 and 1894 drawn from reports compiled by the U.S.
commissioner of labor to extend these recent findings by examining how
geographic and industrial variations in labor market conditions affected em-
ployers' propensity to use strikebreakers and the sources from which they
recruited these replacements." In addition to providing the opportunity to
systematically explore variation in the use of strikebreakers, the disag-
gregated data collected by the Bureau of Labor underscore the impact that
strikebreaking had on late-nineteenth-century labor conflict. The data show
that the use of strikebreakers was remarkably widespread, occurring in more
than 40 percent of the strikes in the sample, and that the use of replacement
workers had a powerful effect on the likelihood of strike success.12 Of those
strikes in which replacements were hired, just 21 percent ended successfully,
and only 6.3 percent were partially successful. In contrast, when replace-
ments were not hired, 63 percent of strikes were successful, and another 9.8
percent were partially successful.13
The data reveal several interesting regularities in the use and recruitment
of strikebreakers. First, contrary to Herbert Gutman's hypothesis that the
stronger support for labor in small communities made it more difficult for
employers to use strikebreakers, the propensity to use strikebreakers did not
vary systematically by either city size or region.14 This result is, however,
'"Currie and Feme, "Strikes."
"These data were originally collected by Gerald Friedman who has generously made them available
to me.
l2In comparison, Cramton and Tracy report that between 1985 and 1989 replacement workers were
employed in just 11 percent of strikes involving 1,000 or more workers, and 17 percent of smaller
strikes.
l3The classification of strikes as successful, partially successful, or failed was performed by the
Bureau of Labor investigators who gathered the strike data. They based their judgments on a
comparison of the objectives of the strike and its outcome. The impact of strikebreaking on strike
success is equally pronounced after conditioning on a wide range of other factors likely to affect the
probability of strike success, including industry, location, establishment size, union authorization, and
the number of strikers.
l4One way in which community support for workers' demands could manifest itself was in commun-
ity resistance to the importation of replacement workers. "Although the mill owners in large cities such
as St. Louis, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati found it easy to bring in new workers from outside," accord-
ing to Gutman, ("Worker's Search," p. 41) "it was another story in small towns. They could easily hire
new hands in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and other eastern cities, but the social environment... made it
difficult to keep these men." Because workers often sought to dissuade strikebreakers verbally or to
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consistent with evidence from other sources indicating the increasing geo-
graphic integration of labor markets in this period. Although the use of
strikebreakers was not affected by city size or region, where these re-
placements came from did vary systematically with locational character-
istics. Employers in smaller communities, and in locations outside the
Northeast were much more likely to have used replacements brought from
other places, suggesting that employer recruitment of labor was an important
factor in promoting the geographic mobility of labor. Second, there was
substantial variation in the use of replacements across industries. Employers
were most likely to use strikebreakers in transportation, printing and pub-
lishing, and food processing and meatpacking and were least likely to hire
replacements in construction and mining. Third, although there is no indi-
cation of any relationship between aggregate economic fluctuations and the
use of strikebreakers, it does appear that employers were more likely to turn
to replacements in the years immediately following the massive upheavals
of 1886. Finally, the data indicate that strikebreaking was less likely to occur
in union-authorized strikes after 1886, suggesting that organized labor was
either becoming more effective in controlling geographic mobility, or that
unions were becoming more adept at picking those fights that they had a
high probability of winning.
STRIKES AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
To contemporaries, the 1880s and early 1890s appeared to be an era of
unprecedented turbulence in the history of labor relations. Labor journalist
John Swinton described the mid-1880s as "revolutionary." hi an 1887 report
the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics noted that "the year 1886 has
witnessed a more profound and far more extended agitation among the
members of organized labor than in any previous year in the history of our
country."15 There is no comprehensive quantitative evidence on strike
activity before 1881, but based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative
indicators, David Montgomery has identified the 1870s as a crucial turning
point in the nature of labor conflict.16 Prior to the mid-1840s, according to
Montgomery, strikes were rare, and riots were the primary vehicle for the
block their way into factories or mines, there was always the potential for violence, and the leanings
of local law enforcement and militia forces could tip the balance in such confrontations either way.
Brecher {Strike!, pp. 6-7) argues that it was precisely this sort of difference in community attitudes that
explains why during the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 employers were able to replace striking workers
in Baltimore, but failed to do so in Martinsburg, West Virginia. Bennett and Earle ("Geography")
interpreted an inverse relationship between strike rates and population for communities with
populations of less than 85,000 as partially confirming Gutman's hypothesis, but examination of
strikebreaking would appear to be a more direct way of testing his conjecture.
l5Both quoted in Foner, History, p. 11.
''Montgomery, "Strikes in Nineteenth-Century America."
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expression of working-class discontent. In the three decades after 1845
strikes spread out geographically and industrially, but for the most part they
remained spontaneous and primarily defensive actions prompted by
employer-initiated wage cuts, or the effects of rapid inflation on real wage
levels. Beginning sometime in the 1870s, however, the extent and nature of
strike activity shifted perceptibly. Increasingly strike objectives shifted from
defensive responses to employer actions toward the achievement of recog-
nition of labor's right to bargain collectively over wages and work rules.
The causes of this transition were undoubtedly complex, but there is little
question that the rapid pace of economic change in the decades after the
Civil War was an important factor contributing to increasing strike activity.
Because strikes are ex post inefficient, most economic models assume that
they occur because workers and employers do not have access to the same
information about firm profitability or the costs that a strike will impose.17
The increasing competition in the labor market during the late nineteenth
century, resulting from greater geographic integration, together with shocks
to supply and demand caused by the emergence of big business and the
spread of organized labor, disrupted existing employment relationships and
created considerable uncertainty about the relative bargaining power of wor-
kers and employers.
Beginning in the 1870s the introduction of capital- and scale-intensive
production processes across a wide range of industries and the development
of new vertically integrated business organizations serving national markets
transformed the manufacturing sector.18 Some sense of the transformation
is conveyed by the rapid growth in the size and capital intensity of manu-
facturing establishments at this time. Between 1870 and 1900 the average
number of employees per establishment more than doubled in 11 of 16
manufacturing industries. These averages, however, mask the growth of
truly large establishments. In 1870 the McCormick plant in Chicago, with
an employment of 400 to 500 workers, was considered one of the largest in
the nation. By 1900 there were 1,063 establishments with employment of
from 500 to 1,000 workers, and an additional 443 employing more than
1,000 workers.19 Capital accumulation was proceeding even more rapidly.
Between 1879 and 1899 the real value of capital per worker in manu-
facturing more than doubled.20
The increasing scale and capital intensity of manufacturing were often
associated with a greater division of labor and the mechanization of pro-
17Strikes are inefficient because, whatever the final outcome, both sides could have been better off
if they had reached this solution without the costs of foregone production and earnings caused by a
strike. See Kennan, "Economics."
'"Chandler, Visible Hand.
"Nelson, Managers, pp. 4—5.
20U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, series P-5 and P-123, pp. 666, 685.
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cesses previously performed by skilled artisans. Some accounts have
emphasized the deskilling nature of late-nineteenth-century technological
change, but the consequences of technological change were often complex.21
Skill has a variety of different dimensions, and the division of labor could
as easily increase skill requirements as decrease them, as David
Montgomery's study of machinists at this time clearly illustrates.22 More-
over, as Andrew Dawson has shown, between 1870 and 1910 the number
of skilled workers grew at least as fast as the total labor force, while the ratio
of skilled to unskilled wages was rising—hardly what one would expect if
deskilling technological change were reducing employers' demand for
skilled workers.23
The impact of changes in technology and business organization were not,
however, confined only to employees in rapidly expanding firms. As large
manufacturers consolidated national markets, smaller more traditional firms
faced increasingly intense competition in product markets. Responding to
these changes, they sought to increase the intensity of work effort or to cut
wages to remain competitive with larger, more efficient producers.24
Paralleling the transformation of the manufacturing sector was a marked
growth of organized labor. The trade union movement in the United States
can be traced back to at least the 1830s, but until the post-Civil War period
most labor unions remained transitory organizations, forming during pros-
perous periods, and collapsing during hard times. It was not until the 1860s
that the first successful national unions were formed.25 Beginning in the late
1870s with several highly publicized successes won by the Knights of
Labor, union membership climbed rapidly. Although the Knights of Labor
proved unable to sustain this enthusiasm after the mid-1880s, membership
in craft unions affiliated with the AFL continued to grow throughout the late
nineteenth century.
Although employers and workers were generally aware of the changes in
market integration, business structure, and labor organization taking place
around them, it was difficult for them to assess how these changes might
affect their bargaining power. In the late 1860s, for example, officials at the
McCormick reaper works in Chicago were aware of the influx of European
immigrants, but uncertain about the relative costs and benefits of replacing
their existing labor force. In an 1867 letter Leander McCormick wrote: "I
have thought... whether it would not be well to employ an agent to send us
[immigrants] as I have seen that [there] are large numbers arriving...." But
there is no evidence that this effort was pursued, suggesting that the cost of
2lGordon et al., Segmented Workers; and Brown and Philips, "Craft Labor."
"Montgomery, "Strikes of Machinists."
"Dawson, "Paradox."
24Currie and Ferrie, "Strikes," p. 3.
"Ulman, Rise, pp. 3—7; and Commons et al., History, pp. 43—44.
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recruiting immigrants proved greater than initially anticipated. Later, in the
1880s, the McCormicks did attempt to replace striking iron molders with the
assistance of their dealers. Although a number of men accepted train tickets
to Chicago, the firm had great difficulty retaining any of them. "Out of the
lot of men you sent us yesterday," they wrote to one dealer in Des Moines,
Iowa, "but two of them showed up in Chicago. . . the balance having de-
serted along the way." To another dealer they complained: "the gentleman
you sent us as a molder. . . did not remain over an hour or two until he
packed his valise and skipped."26
A gap between workers' and employers' perceptions of their respective
bargaining power is also evident in the 1890 strike of leather workers in
Lynn, Massachusetts. According to John Cumbler's account of this conflict,
the workers believed that because of the general prosperity of the industry
and the value of their skills, employers would quickly concede to their
demands. The employers on the other hand, were determined not to give up
any of their control over the workplace, and believed that the cost of
breaking the union would be smaller than the cost of accepting their em-
ployees' demands.27
In the atmosphere of uncertainty that characterized late-nineteenth-century
labor relations, workers and employers found themselves frequently at odds.
The resulting conflicts offer a valuable window on the changing terrain of
labor relations at the time. By studying systematic variations in the use of
strikebreakers (and other strike outcomes) it is possible to gain new insight
about the impact of changing economic conditions on the labor market.
THE STRIKE DATA
Prompted by the rapidly increasing level of labor conflict during the first
half of the 1880s, the U.S. commissioner of labor in 1886 initiated an effort
to compile a comprehensive listing of all strikes that had occurred since
1881. Agents of the Bureau of Labor combed newspapers and other pub-
lications to compile a list of strikes and lockouts for these years. Then field
agents were dispatched to investigate each conflict. Whenever possible these
agents interviewed representatives of both sides in the conflict so as to
corroborate the facts they had gleaned from published accounts. A subse-
quent report extended the collection of data from 1886 through the middle
of 1894. Together these two reports include data on more than 12,000
strikes.28 Previous analysts have regarded the Bureau of Labor's strike data
26Ozanne, Century, pp. 7, 15.
"Cumbler, "Labor," pp. 403-04.
^U.S. Bureau of Labor, Third Annual Report and Tenth Annual Report. Although the bureau contin-
ued to collect data on strikes after 1894, subsequent publications provided only aggregate figures by
state, industry, and year, rather than listing individual strikes, making it impossible to extend the
analysis beyond this year.
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as both "comprehensive and reliable."29 Recently, however, Gary Bailey has
raised questions about the completeness of their coverage.30 Based on a
comparison between local newspapers in Terre Haute, Indiana, and the
strike statistics for 1881 to 1894, he found that of 34 strikes mentioned in
the local press, only about half were included in the Bureau of Labor's tabu-
lation. Although this finding does raise some concern about the comprehen-
siveness of the data, it poses less of a problem for studies such as this one
that explore the relationships between various aspects of individual strikes.
For each strike in its tabulation the bureau reported, among other facts,
the industry and occupation of the workers on strike; whether the strike was
authorized by a union; the number of workers on strike; employment, wages,
and hours before the strike; the duration of the conflict; its cause(s) and out-
come(s), including the number (if any) of replacement workers hired; and
the number of such workers brought from other locations. Unfortunately the
data do not provide any additional information about the sources from which
outside strikebreakers were recruited, or when during the strike they were
hired.
This article employs a random sample of 2,070 strikes drawn from the
strike data.31 The strike statistics are augmented with population data drawn
from the censuses of 1880, 1890, and 1900 and a measure of the skill level
of the workers involved based on the occupational titles reported by the
Bureau of Labor.32 Table 2 summarizes selected characteristics of the strikes
for the sample, as well as for those strikes in which strikebreakers were
hired, and those in which strikebreakers were brought from other places.
The table clearly documents the quantitative significance of strikebreaking
during the late nineteenth century. Replacement workers were hired in 851
strikes (41 percent of the total), and in these instances employers hired an
average of nearly 63 replacement workers. If anything these figures are
likely to understate employers' efforts to use replacements. Striking workers
and their supporters often attempted to prevent strikebreakers from taking
up their jobs through persuasion and the threat or use of force. Only where
employers were in fact successful in putting replacements to work would
they appear in the strike statistics. The use of outside strikebreakers was also
"Montgomery, "Strikes in Nineteenth-Century America," p. 86. The data collection effort is
described in U.S. Bureau of Labor, Third Annual Report, Tenth Annual Report, and Sixteenth Annual
Report. For additional discussion of the data see P. K. Edwards, Strikes ; Friedman, "Strike"; Card and
Olson, "Bargaining Power"; and Currie and Ferrie, "Strikes."
30Bailey, "Commissioner."
31The data consist of a one-in-five random sample of strikes between 1881 and 1886, and a one-in-
ten random sample of strikes between 1887 and 1894.
32 Population data were available for cities with populations in excess of 25,000 in 1900.1 estimated
the population between census years by assuming a constant rate of population increase. I determined
skill levels based on a comparison of occupational titles with the classification scheme elaborated in
Alba Edwards, "Social-Economic Grouping."
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TABLE 2
SELECTED STRIKE CHARACTERISTICS,
All strikes
1881-1894
Strikes with
Replacements
Strikes with
Replacements
Brought from
Elsewhere
N
Average employment before strike
Average number on strike
Average duration in days
Average number of replacements hired
Average number of replacements brought from
elsewhere
Fraction authorized by union
Fraction fully successful
Fraction partially successful
Fraction in cities with 250,000 or more population
Fraction in cities with less than 25,000 population
Fraction in Northeast region
Fraction in North Central region
Fraction for increase in wages
Fraction for reduction in hours
Fraction involving skilled workers
Fraction in which replacement workers were hired
Fraction in which replacement workers were
brought from elsewhere
2070
408.42
202.91
21.50
25.77
12.33
0.657
0.460
0.088
0.356
0.453
0.639
0.290
0.373
0.076
0.368
0.411
851
579.75
282.81
28.27
62.68
29.13
0.632
0.217
0.074
0.326
0.424
0.636
0.287
0.368
0.082
0.374
1.00
269
1060.33
633.79
39.45
129.85
94.81
0.695
0.178
0.093
0.175
0.542
0.501
0.394
0.323
0.082
0.415
1.00
0.130 0.316 1.00
Source: Strike sample data described in text.
quite common, occurring in nearly one-third of the strikes in which any
replacement workers were hired.
It is also apparent that strikes in which replacements were hired differed
in a number of ways from those in which they were not. The use of replace-
ments appears to have been associated with larger strikes and larger estab-
lishments. There is also a positive correlation between the use of strike-
breakers, especially from outside the community, and strike duration; but
without knowing when during the strike replacements were hired, it is im-
possible to determine whether longer duration was a cause or a consequence
of the use of replacements. These differences are all even more pronounced
for the sample of strikes in which replacements were brought from other
places.
THE INCIDENCE OF STRIKEBREAKING
An employer's decision whether to use replacement workers presumably
depends upon his calculation of the balance between the costs and expected
benefits of recruiting strikebreakers. Once a strike has begun the employer
can either recruit replacements or wait for an acceptable settlement to be
negotiated without hiring replacements.33 Suppose that the probability of
33See Cramton and Tracy, "Use," for a more extensive discussion of the inclusion of the use of
strikebreaking within standard bargaining models of strikes.
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ending the strike on the employer's terms is P(S, X), where S is the number
of replacements employed (S <> 0), Xis a vector of exogenous variables, and
P is an increasing function of S. If the employer wins the strike, the net
benefit realized through lower labor costs is L(Y), where Y is a vector of
exogenous variables. The cost of recruiting replacements can be denoted by
C(S, Z), where Z is a vector of exogenous variables, and costs are pre-
sumably an increasing function of the number of replacements recruited.
The employer's objective is to choose 5 to maximize
B(S; X,Y,Z) = P(S, X)*L{Y) - C(S, Z) (1)
subject to the constraint that S must be non-negative. Solving this
maximization problem results in the following reduced-form expression
relating the optimal number of replacements to other strike characteristics
S*= G(X, Y, Z), when G(X, Y, Z) > 0 (2)
= 0 otherwise
Using data on strikebreaking and other strike characteristics drawn from the
Bureau of Labor's strike reports it is possible to estimate this relationship.
The first task is to identify the exogenous variables that affected the costs
and expected benefits of hiring strikebreakers. Despite increasing geographic
integration in this period, some regional differences in labor supply may
have persisted, affecting the costs of hiring replacements. The bulk of
European immigration passed through port cities in the Northeast, and this
may have lowered the cost of recruiting replacements in this region. On the
other hand, the use of convict leasing in the South may have lowered the
cost of obtaining strikebreakers in this region. In an imperfectly integrated
labor market, employers in smaller places would also face a smaller supply
of potential strikebreakers, and hence a higher cost of recruiting replace-
ments. If the residents of smaller communities were more likely to feel a
sense of solidarity with striking workers, as Herbert Gutman and others have
speculated, this effect would be reinforced by the greater community
opposition to strikebreaking in smaller places.34 It also seems possible that
the supply of potential strikebreakers would vary with aggregate economic
fluctuations, increasing as the unemployment rate rose.
The issue of controlling migratory labor was central to the emergence in
this period of national trade unions.35 To the extent that unions were ef-
fective in achieving this goal, the supply of strikebreakers would be smaller
in union-authorized strikes, and hence the cost of hiring replacements would
be higher. The effect of union authorization seems likely to have increased
^Gutman, "Worker's Search."
35Ulman, Rise, chaps. 2—3; and Commons et al., History, pp. 307-12.
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after the mid-1880s as national unions affiliated with the American Feder-
ation of Labor became more adept at using strike funds to discipline local
unions and maintain solidarity among striking workers. Gerald Friedman has
found that after 1886 the shift in union strategy did indeed increase the
likelihood of success for union-authorized strikes.36
The cost of recruiting strikebreakers would also depend on the extent of
training that they required and on the amount of hostility that introducing
new workers might induce among current employees. To some extent these
factors are likely to be a function of the skill level of the striking workers,
but they may also have been at least partly functions of industry charac-
teristics. Finally, the costs of recruiting replacements would be expected to
rise as the number of workers on strike increased.
Employers in this period often evidenced a profound hostility to unions,
which figured in their calculation of the benefits of recruiting strikebreakers.
The bitter Homestead conflict of 1892, for example, was motivated by
Andrew Carnegie's desire to break the union.37 Similarly, when leather
workers in Lynn, Massachusetts, went on strike in 1890, the manufacturers
agreed to fight the union and bring the open shop to the city.38 This suggests
that the perceived benefits of winning a strike may have been greater when
it was authorized by a union than when it was a spontaneous protest.
Employers may also have viewed the benefits of winning as greater when
the strike was offensive in nature (over issues like wage increases, hours
reductions, or work rules), than when it was a spontaneous, defensive
response to employer-initiated wage cuts. Because the costs of foregone
production imposed by a strike were likely to be an increasing function of
establishment size, the benefits of ending a strike should be an increasing
function of prestrike employment. The costs imposed by a work stoppage
(and hence the benefits of ending it) would also vary across industries
depending on the ability of employers to build up inventories in anticipation
of a strike, and the potential loss of customers that would follow from a
temporary interruption in supplies. In general, this suggests that employers
in service industries, and industries with highly perishable products or
highly competitive markets would have perceived the benefits of using re-
placements to be greater. Finally, the expected benefit that employers per-
ceived from recruiting replacements depended not only on the cost saving
they anticipated from a successful conclusion of the strike, but also on the
probability that this event would occur. Other things equal, it seems likely
that that probability of winning would be a decreasing function of the num-
ber of workers on strike.
"Friedman, "Strike," pp. 13-17.
"Foner, History, pp. 208-09.
38Cumbler, "Labor," pp. 403-04
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Because of the large number of strikes in which no strikebreakers were
used, ordinary least squares is not an appropriate method to estimate the
relationship described in equation 2. To allow for the possibility that the
function G is discontinuous at zero, I employed a two stage estimation pro-
cedure. In the first stage I estimated a probit equation in which the depend-
ent variable takes the value one if any strikebreakers were used, and zero
otherwise. In the second stage I estimated by ordinary least squares the de-
terminants of the number of replacement workers hired (measured in logs).
To control for possible sample selection bias in this equation I included the
inverse Mills's ratio calculated from the first stage probit estimates.39 Be-
cause the reasons for a strike's occurrence are likely to affect an employer's
willingness to use strikebreakers, but not the number of replacements needed
to defeat the strike, I excluded strike cause effects from the second-stage
estimation of the determinants of the number of replacements hired.40
To capture locational differences in the supply of strikebreakers, zero-one
indicator variables for three regions and four city-size classes are included.
To control for the effects of skill and industry on the costs and benefits of
employing strikebreakers, an indicator variable for highly skilled workers
and a set of indicators for 14 of the most common industries in the data are
included. Indicators variables for each year are included to control for
macroeconomic fluctuations that might have affected the supply of potential
strikebreakers. To control for the impact of differences in strike causes,
indicator variables are included for defensive strikes and for strikes initiated
by labor demands for higher wages or shorter hours. The excluded category
is strikes over work rules. Indicators are also included to measure the effects
of union-authorization and possible changes in this effect after 1886. Finally,
39The need to correct for sample selection arises because the OLS regression is restricted to only
those observations for which S is nonzero. The problem can be seen most clearly by considering an em-
pirical analog of equation 2, which adds an error term u to reflect the impact of unobserved char-
acteristics. Letting i index individual observations and assuming that the function G(X, Y, Z, u) can be
approximated as linear in its arguments, the model then becomes 5, = aX, + bYt+ cZ, + M,, where a, b,
and c are vectors of coefficients. Rearranging terms, it is apparent that the condition S, > 0 is equivalent
to the condition that u, > -aX, - bY, - cZt. Thus, even if it is assumed that the expected value of u, is
zero across the entire sample, this will clearly not be true for the set of strikes for which S, is nonzero,
violating one of the underlying assumptions of OLS model. Heckman, "Sample Selection Bias," has
shown, however, that this problem can be resolved by adding an estimate of the expected value of u,
to the regression. This additional regressor is the ratio §(Z) I $(-Z) where <|> and 0 are, respectively,
the density and distribution functions of the standard normal variable, and Z, is an estimate oft/,- divided
by its standard error derived from the probit estimates over the full sample. The ratio cb / $ is the
inverse of Mills's ratio. See, also Madala, Limited-dependent and Qualitative Variables, pp. 158-59,
for additional discussion and references.
40An alternative approach to estimating equation 2 would be to use the Tobit model, but this imposes
the unnecessary restriction that the slope coefficients be continuous at zero (see Maddala, Limited-
Dependent and Qualitative Variables, chap. 6). In terms of signs and relative magnitudes Tobit
estimates (not reported here) closely resemble the results obtained from the first-stage probit estimation.
As will be seen later, however, the impact of several variables on the number of replacements hired
appears to be quite different from that on employers' propensity to use replacements.
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measures of prestrike employment and the number of workers on strike are
included to control for scale effects.
Table 3 reports the results of estimating both equations. Because the coef-
ficient estimates of the probit equation are not directly interpretable they are
transformed into slope coefficients. For discrete variables the table reports
the implied effect on the predicted probability of using replacement workers
that would result from changing the variable's value from zero to one when
all the other independent variables are set at their sample means. For the
continuous variables, the table reports the implied partial derivative of the
probability of using replacement workers with respect to that variable, where
the derivative is evaluated at the sample means of the independent variables.
The probit estimates indicate that locational effects on the propensity to
use replacement workers appear quite limited. None of the regional effects
is large in magnitude or statistically significant. Several of the city-size vari-
ables are statistically significant, but the direction of these effects is incon-
sistent, and not especially large. Employers in cities with populations of
250,000 or more appear to have been somewhat less likely to use replace-
ments, whereas those in the next largest size class—those with populations
between 100,000 and 250,000—were somewhat more likely to use replace-
ments. On the basis of these estimates there is no indication that employers
in smaller places faced higher costs of recruiting replacements. In contrast
to the limited impact of location, industry effects were much more pro-
nounced. Employers in transportation, printing, and food preparation were
10 to 20 percentage points more likely to use replacement workers than were
employers in the excluded category of miscellaneous industries. Evaluated
at the predicted probability of using replacements of 40 percent, this implies
that the use of replacements was one-quarter to one-half more likely in these
industries. In view of the relative successes of organized labor in the build-
ing trades it is perhaps not surprising that the use of replacements was 12
percentage points less likely in construction than in miscellaneous industries.
Of greater note, however, the data indicate that despite numerous accounts
of strikebreaking and violence aimed at strikebreakers in mining, employers
in this industry were nearly 18 percentage points less likely to use replace-
ments than in the excluded category. If there is a pattern here, it appears to
be that employers in industries with perishable products were more likely to
use replacements, other things equal, than were those in industries where the
durability of products reduced the short-run costs of strike-caused interrup-
tions in production. After controlling for industry there does not appear to
be any significant effect of skill levels on the probability of strikebreaking.
It may be that this variable is poorly constructed, however, and industry
effects are already capturing the important variations in skill level.
None of the strike cause effects is large or statistically significant, but the
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variable for union authorization after 1886 enters with a negative and statis-
tically significant effect. This suggests that either unions were becoming bet-
ter at choosing which struggles they were likely to win or union control of
mobility was becoming more effective in limiting strikebreaking during the
latter 1880s and early 1890s and that these effects outweighed any impact
of employer antipathy toward unions in this period. Both of the scale vari-
ables enter the regression significantly, and with the expected signs.41 Em-
ployers were more likely to turn to replacements the larger the establish-
ment, or the smaller the number of workers on strike. The magnitudes of the
two coefficients suggest that effects of establishment size were somewhat
stronger than those of the number of strikers, so that holding constant the
fraction of workers on strike, the use of replacements was more common in
large establishments than in small ones.
Only a few of the year effects are statistically significant, and their pattern
does not suggest any consistent cyclical effects on employers' propensity to
use strikebreakers. On the other hand the large positive effects in 1886,
1887, and 1888 suggest that employers may have increased their use of
replacement workers in the wake of the pronounced unrest that culminated
in the strike wave of 1886.
The ordinary least squares estimates of the determinants of the number of
replacements hired indicate that the strongest explanatory factors are scale
effects. The log of the number of strikers is highly significant and suggests
that employers attempted to replace a little over 40 percent of their striking
workers. Holding the number of workers on strike constant, the number of
replacements hired was also increasing with establishment size. The coeffic-
ient on this variable implies that every 10 percent increase in establishment
size increased the number of replacements by 2.4 percent.
Several other interesting patterns also emerge after controlling for these
scale factors. First, the city-size effects suggest that when employers in mid-
sized cities turned to replacements they hired larger numbers of them than
was true of employers in cities with populations either under 25,000 or
greater than 249,999. Only two of the industry effects enter the regression
significantly, but both are in industries in which the propensity to replace
was higher than usual. In both transportation and printing and publishing,
not only were employers more likely to use replacement workers, but when
they used replacements they tended to hire more of them. Finally, the insig-
nificant coefficient on the inverse Mills's ratio indicates that the hypothesis
of no sample selection bias cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels.
4lThe coefficients imply that a one standard deviation increase in the number of employees before
the strike would raise the probability of using replacement workers by 7 percentage points, whereas a
one standard deviation increase in the number of workers on strike would lower the probability of using
replacements by 4.6 percentage points.
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TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF THE USE OF REPLACEMENTS AND THE LOG OF THE NUMBER
OF REPLACEMENTS HIRED
Variable
City size effects'1
25.000-49,999
50,000-99,999
100,000-249,999
250,000 or more
Region effects0
North Central
South
West
Industry and occupation
effects'1
Transportation
Construction
Mining
Stone quarrying and
cutting
Metals and metalic
goods
Machinery
Printing and publishing
Furniture
Wooden goods
Boots and shoes
Clothing
Tobacco and cigars
Glass
Food preparation,
canning, butchering
Skilled occupation
Strike cause effects0
Wage increase
Hours reduction
Defensive
Strike characteristics
effects
Logfno. of employees)
Log(no. of strikers)
Authorized by union
Authorized by union,
1887-1894
Year effects'
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
Mean
0.060
0.073
0.085
0.356
0.289
0.061
0.010
0.054
0.167
0.087
0.043
0.094
0.022
0.032
0.033
0.024
0.046
0.074
0.079
0.021
0.022
0.368
0.373
0.076
0.147
4.539
3.691
0.657
0.396
0.043
6.048
0.065
0.065
0.173
Standard
Deviation
0.237
0.259
0.278
0.479
0.454
0.240
0.098
0.226
0.373
0.281
0.203
0.292
0.146
0.176
0.178
0.152
0.210
0.262
0.269
0.143
0.147
0.482
0.484
0.265
0.355
1.580
1.538
0.475
0.489
0.202
0.213
0.207
0.246
0.378
Probit Regression for
Use of Replacements'
Coefficient
-0.0042
-0.0077
0.0712
-0.0666
-0.0234
0.0004
-0.0180
0.1036
-0.1191
-0.1784
-0.0442
-0.0613
-0.0652
0.1836
0.0286
-0.0091
-0.0383
0.0449
0.0198
-0.1088
0.1311
0.0413
-0.0417
0.0180
-0.0434
0.0435
-0.0299
0.0176
-0.0872
0.0917
0.1769
0.0484
0.0124
0.0688
/-statistic
-0.087
-0.169
1.615'
-2.365"
-0.891
0.009
-0.160
1.890'
-2.756""
-3.827"'
-0.710
-1.367
-0.817
2.523"
0.415
-0.117
-0.656
0.889
0.395
-1.357
1.605"
1.354
-1.574
0.383
-1.219
3.597""
-2.412"
0.468
-1.826'
1.209
2.430"
0.649
0.182
1.160
OLS Regression for
Log (Number of
Replacements)
Coefficient
0.3013
0.4213
0.3191
-0.1743
0.0107
0.0429
-1.0183
0.6605
-0.2336
-0.1353
0.1588
-0.0736
0.2847
0.7609
0.1537
0.1067
-0.2095
-0.0179
0.0547
-0.3658
0.1535
0.1058
0.2424
0.4181
0.1594
-0.0961
0.0362
0.5321
0.1919
0.1742
-0.0101
/-statistic
2.064"
3.549'"
1.816"
-1.234
0.120
0.326
-1.814"
2.877""
-1.009
-0.360
0.891
-0.407
1.091
2.352"
0.696
0.459
-1.051
-0.098
0.324
-1.070
0.419
0.863
3.070'"
6.531"'
1.249
-0.490
0.135
1.500
0.768
0.719
-0.043
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TABLE 3—contiued
Variable
1887
1888
1889
1890
1892
1893
1894
Constant
Inverse Mills's ratio
N
Chi2
R2
Mean
0.081
0.050
0.060
0.098
0.074
0.072
0.048
Standard
Deviation
0.237
0.219
0.238
0.297
0.263
0.259
0.215
Probit Regression for
Use of Replacements8
Coefficient
0.1001
0.1435
0.0723
0.0381
0.0725
0.0712
0.0926
2045
117.29
/-statistic
1.392
1.807'
0.953
0.540
0.994
0.970
1.170
OLS Regression for
Log (Number of
Replacements)
Coefficient /-statistic
0.2943 0.973
0.3787 1.147
0.2366 0.842
-0.1025 -0.393
-0.1451 -0.536
-0.1057 -0.389
0.3058 1.088
-1.4010 -1.277
1.2110 1.293
838
0.507
" Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
" Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
*" Statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
a Coefficients are reported as the partial derivatives of the probability with respect to each variable,
evaluated at the sample mean values of the other independent variables. For zero-one categorical
variables the coefficient shows the change in probability for a discrete change in that variable from zero
to one. The /-statistics reported are calculated using the original probit parameters and their
corresponding standard errors.
b Omitted category is cities with population under 25,000.
c Omitted category is Northeast.
d Omitted category is all other industries
e Omitted category is strikes over work rules.
f Omitted category is 1881.
Note: /-statistics are computed using heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. The observed
probability of strikebreaking is 0.4098, and the predicted probability is 0.4058.
Source: Strike sample data described in the text.
THE RECRUITMENT OF STRIKEBREAKERS
That location had little impact on the ability of employers to find replace-
ment workers is consistent with other evidence of the emergence of an in-
creasingly integrated national labor market after the Civil War and suggests
that employers in smaller communities were able to tap into broader labor
markets with relative ease.42 Using information on the recruitment of strike-
breakers from other places sheds further light on the role that employer
recruitment played in mobilizing labor as well as on the impact that high
rates of labor mobility had on labor conflict in this period. Unfortunately the
42Rosenbloom, "National Labor Market" and "Extent." Finding that the use of replacement workers
did not vary appreciably across locations is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence
of labor market integration. Because I cannot determine the sources from which strikebreakers were re-
cruited it is not possible to directly assess the geographic scope of markets that this finding implies. On
the other hand, integration does imply that employers would face similar costs of recruiting replace-
ments, independent of location.
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TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF THE USE OF REPLACEMENTS BROUGHT FROM OTHER PLACES
AND LOG OF THE NUMBER OF REPLACEMENTS BROUGHT FROM OTHER PLACES
Variable
City size effects'"
25,000-^9,999
50,000-99,999
100,000-249,999
250,000 or more
Region effects0
North Central
South
West
Industry and occupation effects'1
Transportation
Construction
Mining
Stone quarrying and cutting
Metals and metalic goods
Machinery
Printing and publishing
Furniture
Wooden goods
Boots and shoes
Clothing
Tobacco and cigars
Glass
Food preparation, canning,
butchering
Skilled occupation
Strike cause effects"
Wage increase
Hours reduction
Defensive
Strike characteristics effects
Log(no. of employees)
Log(no. of strikers)
Authorized by union
Authorized by union,
1887-1894
Year effects'
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
Probit Regression for Use of
Outside Replacements2
Coefficient
0.0509
-0.0865
-0.1345
-0.2619
0.2094
0.1011
0.1197
0.0735
0.0364
-0.0649
0.1973
0.0446
0.0881
0.3736
-0.0714
-0.2251
0.1304
0.0411
-0.0767
0.0456
0.1228
-0.0103
-0.0037
0.0782
0.0914
-0.0236
0.0881
0.1312
0.0007
-0.0303
-0.0515
-0.0030
-0.0853
-0.0811
0.0558
-0.0241
0.1534
-0.0471
0.0741
^-statistic
0.689
-1.521
-2.637'"
-6.734'"
5.156'"
1.346
0.650
0.999
0.507
-0.851
1.919'
0.645
0.812
3.701""
-0.630
-2.537'"
1.454
0.541
-1.028
0.349
1.082
-0.226
-0.090
1.065
1.676'
-1.321
4.658""
2.401"
0.011
-0.288
-0.536
-0.030
-0.890
-0.972
0.508
-0.207
1.253
-0.441
0.659
OLS Regression for
Log(Number of Outside
Replacements)
Coefficient
-0.0423
0.2283
-0.4381
-0.6523
0.4177
0.3081
0.2856
0.3184
-0.1691
0.0822
0.0559
-0.2622
0.5567
0.1538
-0.8814
-0.5916
-0.5039
-0.6254
-0.8274
0.0831
0.5533
-0.2074
0.0632
0.6600
0.4581
0.0427
-0.3361
-0.2599
0.2164
-0.5509
-0.3593
-0.0953
-0.2576
-0.2097
-0.8098
-0.0926
r-statistic
-0.211
0.833
-1.339
-1.603
1.513
1.446
0.888
1.185
-0.668
0.256
0.151
-0.907
1.317
-0.313
-1.852*
-0.866
-1.330
-2.023"
-2.844"*
0.165
0.690
-1.070
0.803
5.071""
1.567
0.161
-0.998
-0.739
0.677
-1.353
-1.060
-0.221
-0.671
-0.487
-1.986"
-0.245
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TABLE 4—continued
Variable
1892
1893
1894
Constant
Inverse Mills's ratio
N
Chi2
R1
Probit Regression for Use of
Outside Replacements3
Coefficient ^-statistic
-0.0602 -0.574
0.0727 0.631
0.1020 0.809
838
183.33
OLS Regression for
Log(Number of Outside
Replacements)
Coefficient /-statistic
-0.6641 -1.601
-0.2173 -0.519
-0.2386 -0.549
-0.6807 -0.547
0.7727 1.109
263
0.615
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
" Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
a Coefficients are reported as the partial derivatives of the probability with respect to each variable,
evaluated at the sample mean values of the other independent variables. For zero-one categorical
variables the coefficient shows the change in probability for a discrete change in that variable from zero
to one. The ^-statistics reported are calculated using the originally estimated probit parameters and their
corresponding standard errors.
b Omitted category is cities with population under 25,000.
c Omitted category is Northeast.
d Omitted category is all other industries
e Omitted category is strikes over work rules.
f Omitted category is 1881.
Note: f-statistics are computed using heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. The probability of
bringing replacement workers from elsewhere is estimated using the sample of strikes in which some
replacement workers were hired. The observed probability of bringing replacements from elsewhere
in this sample is 0.3127, and the predicted probability is 0.2742.
Source: Strike sample data described in the text.
strike statistics do not contain information about the sources from which
outside strikebreakers were recruited, so it cannot be determined whether
replacements were recruited over long distances or were drawn from the
immediate environs of the strike. It is clear, however, that by the 1880s a
well-developed network of employment agencies capable of supplying large
numbers of unskilled workers was in operation in major cities, and
numerous anecdotal accounts suggest that strikebreakers were in at least
some cases recruited over long distances.43
The same empirical framework used to analyze employers' decisions to
use strikebreakers can be applied as well to consider their choice of whether
to seek strikebreakers locally, or to recruit them from more distant locations.
43Rosenbloom, "Employment Agencies" and "Looking for Work." To cite just a few instances of
long-distance recruiting: Cumbler ("Labor," pp. 407,409) reports that leather manufacturers in Lynn,
Massachusetts, advertised in Montreal for replacements, and many of the strikebreakers whom they
hired appear to have come form Newark; Tuttle ("Some Strikebreakers") finds that in the Chicago
meatpacking strike of 1904 replacements came from as far away as Baltimore; Foner (History, pp.
208-09,233) reports that in Coer D'Alene, Idaho, mine operators recruited replacements from Duluth,
Minnesota; and during the Homestead strike Andrew Carnegie advertised for replacements in
newspapers in Boston, St. Louis, and Philadelphia.
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Restricting the sample to those strikes in which replacement workers were
used, I first estimated a probit equation where the dependent variable takes
the value one if any strikebreakers were brought from elsewhere, and then
estimated the determinants of the number of replacement workers brought
from elsewhere (measured in logs) by ordinary least squares, controlling for
sample selection bias. The independent variables used in the two equations
are identical to those used in Table 3. The results of estimating these two
equations are reported in Table 4.
hi contrast to the limited role location played in employers' propensity to
use strikebreakers, Table 4 reveals strong and systematic locational effects
on the use of outside replacements. Beginning with cities of 50,000 or more
population, city-size effects are negative and increasingly large in magnitude
as city size increases. Overall, outside replacements were used in about 30
percent of strikes in which any replacements were hired. The estimated city-
size effects imply that the probability of using outside replacements was re-
duced to just 17 percent in cities between 100,000 and 250,000 population,
and was less than 5 percent in cities with populations of 250,000 or more.
Even after controlling for city size, employers outside the Northeast were
substantially more likely to use outside replacements than employers in the
Northeast. Because of small sample sizes in the South and West, however,
only the coefficient estimate for the North Central region is statistically
significant.
The industry effects do not suggest any very clear pattern. Printing and
publishing, in which both the propensity to replace and the number of
replacements hired were higher than average, was also characterized by a
higher propensity to use outside replacements. The propensity to use outside
replacements was also higher in stone quarrying and cutting, whereas it was
lower than average in wooden goods.
Among the strike characteristics variables, it appears that employers were
considerably more likely to recruit replacements from other places in the
face of union-authorized strikes than in the case of those without union auth-
orization. This suggests that unions were able to enforce a degree of solidar-
ity locally, but that, as Lloyd Ulman has argued, high rates of geographic
mobility in this period posed a significant challenge for local unions' efforts
to gain employer recognition, and served as an important impetus in the
movement toward the formation of national unions.44 The propensity to
recruit strikebreakers from other places was also increasing with the number
of workers on strike. This variable was also associated with increases in the
demand for replacements, suggesting that as the number of replacements
desired increased, employers were obliged to look further afield to find suf-
ficient supplies of strikebreakers.
•"Ulman, Rise.
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The regression for the number of replacements recruited from outside
reinforces the impression that, other things equal, the number of replace-
ments required was an important determinant of employers' need to recruit
replacements at a distance. The log of the number of strikers enters with a
large and statistically significant effect in this regression. This coefficient
implies that a 10 percent increase in the number of workers on strike would
increase the number of outside replacements hired by 6.6 percent. Although
none of the city-size or regional effects is statistically significant, their signs
and relative magnitudes reinforce the impression gleaned from the probit
equation that employers in smaller cities and outside the Northeast tended
to rely more heavily on outside replacements, hi those rare instances when
employers in cities with populations over 100,000 turned to outside replace-
ments, the estimated coefficients imply that they used fewer of them than did
their counterparts in smaller places. Similarly, when employers outside the
Northeast recruited outside strikebreakers they tended to recruit more of
them than was true of employers within the Northeast. Finally, the coef-
ficient on the inverse Mill's ratio implies that the hypothesis of no sample
selection bias cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels.
CONCLUSION
During the late nineteenth century increasing labor market integration and
technological change made it easier for employers to replace striking wor-
kers. Although labor historians have long believed that employers' use of
strikebreakers was an important factor undermining organized labor in this
period, discussion of strikebreaking has been based largely on evidence
drawn from a few highly visible incidents. The individual strike data ana-
lyzed in this article confirm earlier impressions of both the ubiquity and sig-
nificance of strikebreaking for labor relations in the 1880s and early 1890s.
Strikebreaking was indeed quite common, occurring in over 40 percent of
all strikes, and exerted a powerful influence on the chances of strike success.
Beyond this, however, the strike data also offer a number of important in-
sights about variations in the effects of changing labor market conditions on
workers in different industries and locations. First, evidence of systematic
variation across locations in the recruitment of outside replacements and the
absence of any locational effects on employers' propensity to use strike-
breakers suggest that neither geographic isolation nor community solidarity
provided strikers with much protection against the threat of replacement.
The greater propensity of employers to recruit outside strikebreakers in
union-authorized strikes further underscores the impact that high rates of
geographic mobility in this period had in undermining organized labor's
efforts to win recognition in this period. Second, the risk of replacement
varied substantially across industries. Industry is a proxy for a wide range
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of possible influences, but it appears that employers were most likely to
replace striking workers in industries where the perishability of products
made strikes most costly. Third, it appears that after 1886 either the efforts
of national trade unions to use strike funds to control mobility among their
members were successful in reducing the supply of strikebreakers in union-
authorized strikes, or that the national unions were becoming more adept at
selecting those conflicts in which they had the greatest chance of success.
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